10 June 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DCI Appearance Before CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services Committee, 10 June 1963, 10 a.m.

1. The Director appeared before the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services on 10 June. In attendance for the Subcommittee were:

Carl Vinson (D., Ga.), Chairman
Melvin Price (D., III.)
Charles E. Bennett (D., Fla.)
George Huddleston, Jr. (D., Ala.)
Frank C. Osmers, Jr. (R., N. J.)
Leslie C. Arends (R., III.) ex officio member
Robert W. Smart, Chief Counsel

Present for the Agency were:

John A. McCone, Director
Richard Helms, Deputy Director (Plans)
Ray S. Cline, Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Desmond Fitzgerald, Chief, Special Affairs Staff
Arthur C. Lundahl, NPIC

DCI
Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel

2. Before the formal start of the meeting, the Director displayed to the Chairman and several members a copy of a Current Intelligence Weekly Review together with the reports which are issued as annexes to the Review as examples of a small part of the intelligence product of the Agency. The Chairman seemed quite interested and appeared to believe this was useful material

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and inquired about distribution. He was told it went to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and to the key national security officials.

- Mr. Cline started the formal briefing with the situation in Laos as the first item. At the conclusion, Mr. Arends asked if this could not be summed up as a worsening situation, and Mr. Cline agreed. Mr. Osmers asked whether USSR or the Chinese Communists were furnishing the military supplies to the Pathet Lao, and Mr. Cline said this was a hard question to answer, although some of the materiel appeared to be Chinese-type weapons. Mr. Osmers asked why were we negotiating with the Soviets in Moscow about the Laotian situation when the Chinese Communists were doing the actual supporting. It was pointed out that originally the Russians had been definitely airlifting material in and stopped after the Geneva negotiations and that they were probably in a difficult position, not wanting to violate their commitments but not being able in effect to control the situation. Mr. Osmers said he thought negotiations with the Soviets were merely a semantic haggle and what the U. S. must do is make a policy decision to really stand up to the situation in Laos or pull out entirely.
- 4. Mr. Cline then gave a briefing on Yemen, and it appeared that the Subcommittee members had not been very fully informed either on the area or the recent happenings there. The Director pointed out that the real danger in this situation was that it brought us into a direct confrontation with Nasser in view of our commitments in Saudi Arabia. The actual commitments to the Saudi Arabian government are vague, and there is no real treaty such as a Mutual Defense Act, but in view of our oil interests commitments are inherent in the situation. Mr. Vinson asked what kind of people the Yemeni were, and Mr. Cline said they were Semitic Arabic people like the rest of the population of the peninsula. Mr. Osmers asked about their economy, and Mr. Cline pointed out it was agricultural and listed their crops and exports and imports but pointed out that it was on a very small scale. He also answered that the population was 4,000,000. Mr. Osmers asked what Nasser's aim was in this whole business, and Mr. Cline pointed out that it was basically part of his Pan-Arab thesis, although in view of the rather messy situation in Yemen Nasser probably did not want that country to join the UAR. The Director said that Nasser probably thought he could flank the Saudi Arabians with Syria and Iraq on the North and Yemen on the South and that certain air drops of military equipment to the north of Yemen had probably been designed for insurgents in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Vinson observed that this whole area before World War I had all been part of the Ottoman Empire and asked how many governments

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